Florida v. Nixon
125 S. Ct. 551 (2004) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 17 | Issue 2 Article 13
Spring 3-1-2005
Florida v. Nixon 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Florida v. Nixon 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004), 17 Cap. DEF J. 421 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol17/iss2/13
Florida v. Nixon
125 S. Ct. 551 (2004)
I. Facts
Assistant public defender Michael Corin was assigned to representJoe Elton
Nixon on the charge of first-degree murder and associated offenses including
kidnapping, robbery, and arson. Corin filed a not guilty plea and proceeded to
depose the State's witnesses. Certain that Nixon's guilt was not seriously in
doubt, Corin initiated plea negotiations with the hope that prosecutors would
take the death penalty off the table. The prosecutors refused, and negotiations
broke down.'
The evidence, as revealed at trial, weighed heavily against Nixon.2 On
Monday morning, August 13, 1984, a motorist discovered Jeanne Bickner's
charred body near a dirt road outside of Tallahassee, Florida. The following day,
police arrested Nixon after they received word from his brother and girlfriend
that Nixon had confessed to the killing.4 When questioned by police, Nixon
related in detail the chronology of events leading up to and including Bickner's
murder.' Additional evidence linking Nixon to the murder included witnesses
who placed Nixon in a parking lot with Bickner prior to the murder and who
identified Nixon as the man driving in Bickner's MG following the murder.
6
Police also matched a palm print found on the trunk of the MG to Nixon, and
prosecutors entered into evidence a pawn shop receipt, signed by Nixon, for two
of Bickner's rings.'
Given the weight of evidence against Nixon, Corin concluded that the only
way to save Nixon's life was to concede guilt at trial in order to preserve credibil-
ity with the jury at sentencing.8 On at least three occasions, Corin attempted to
explain this decision to Nixon.9 Nixon, consistently reticent in his interactions
with Corin, neither approved of nor protested Corin's proposed defense
strategy."1
1. Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551, 556-57 (2004).
2. Id. at 555-58.
3. Id. at 555.
4. Id. at 556.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 556.
8. Id. at 556-57.
9. Id. at 557.
10. Id.
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On the second day of voir dire, Nixon refused to enter the courtroom."
Defense counsel informed the judge that Nixon had stripped down to his
underwear and was insisting upon a black judge and attorney."2 Nixon refused
to attend his trial because, according to a court officer, he was not going to let
them "railroad" him.13 The trial court conducted a hearing in Nixon's cell and
concluded that, if Nixon failed to appear in court that afternoon, his decision
would constitute a " '[knowing], voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to
be present during the course of the trial.' "',' Nixon did not return to the court-
room, and the judge ruled that the trial could proceed in absentia.'
In his opening statement, Corin remarked, "In this case, there won't be any
question, none whatsoever, that my clientJoe Elton Nixon, causedJeannie [sic]
Bickner's death. Likewise, that fact will be proved to your satisfaction beyond
any reasonable doubt."' 6 However, consistent with his proposed defense strat-
egy, Corin also indicated to the jurors that they would learn in the penalty phase
the reasons why Nixon should not receive death. 7 During the trial, Corin
conducted little cross-examination, questioning the State's witnesses only as
needed for clarification. 8 He did not otherwise present a guilt-phase defense. 9
In his closing argument, Corin again conceded guilt and reminded the jurors that
he would present, in the second phase, "reasons[,] not that Mr. Nixon's life be
spared..., but that he not be sentenced to die."'  Nixon was convicted on each
of the crimes charged.2' The jury recommended, and the trial court imposed, the
death penalty.'
On direct appeal and represented by new counsel, Nixon argued that
Corin's concessions of guilt" 'were the functional equivalent of a guilty plea'"
11. Brief for Respondent at 4, Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (U.S.July 21,2004) (No. 03-
931); see Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336, 1346 (Fla. 1991) [hereinafter Nixon ] (affirming Nixon's
conviction and death sentence).
12. Brief for Respondent at 4, Nixon (No. 03-931).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 5 (quoting Nixon 1, 572 So. 2d at 1341); see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.180(c) (allowing a
defendant to voluntarily absent himself from the courtroom). During the hearing, " 'Nixon
repeatedly stated that he wanted to return to the jail-house and did not care if the trial proceeded
without him.' " Brief for Respondent at 5, Nixon (No. 03-931) (quoting Nixon 1, 572 So. 2d at
1341).
15. Brief for Respondent at 5, Nixon (No. 03-931).
16. Nixon I, 572 So. 2d at 1339.
17. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. May 14, 2004) (No. 03-
931).
18. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 558.
19. Id.
20. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Nixon (No. 03-931).
21. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 558.
22. Id.
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entered without Nixon's express consent.23 Counsel contended that under the
standard set forth by United States v. Croni,24 Corin's trial strategy failed to subject
the prosecution's case to any" 'meaningful adversarial testing.' ,25 Accordingly,
counsel argued that Corin's concession should be presumed prejudicial and,
therefore, ineffective. 26 The Supreme Court of Florida remanded for an eviden-
tiary hearing on the issue but despite the hearing, the court ultimately declined
to resolve the issue on what the court considered to be a still-inconclusive
record.27
Nixon renewed his Cronic claim in a motion for postconviction relief.28 In
Nixon v. Singletagy,9 the Supreme Court of Florida equated Corin's opening and
closing comments with a plea of guilty and held that a defendant must explicitly
and affirmatively consent to an attorney's concession of guilt.3" The court ruled
that, without that consent, a defendant is constructively denied counsel and
therefore, counsel's assistance is presumptively ineffective under Cronic.3' The
23. Brief for Respondent at 8-9, Nixon (No. 03-931) (quoting Nixon 1, 572 So. 2d at
1338-39); see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) (concluding that reversible error
occurred when the record did not show that the defendant voluntarily entered a guilty plea).
Nixon's counsel consistently argued that Brookhart v. Janis extended the Bqykin requirement of
affirmative consent to "procedures that are the functional equivalent of a guilty plea in that they
involve a surrender of the right to contest the prosecution's factual case on the issue of guilt or
innocence." Brief for Respondent at 32, Nixon (No. 03-931); see Brookhart v.Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 6-7
(1966) (finding that defense counsel's agreement to a "prima fade" case was the "equivalent of a
guilty plea').
24. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
25. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 559 (quoting Unites States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984); see
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59 (concluding that under certain narrow circumstances in which a
defendant has been denied assistance of counsel entirely, a defendant need not satisfy the prejudice
prong of Strickland v. Washington in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim);
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984) (holding that to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel a defendant "must show that counsel's performance was deficient" and that
the deficiency prejudiced the defense to such a degree so "as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial").
26. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 559; see Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (stating that "if counsel entirely fails
to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of
Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable'). In the
alternative, Nixon argued that Corin rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.
Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 559 n.4.
27. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 559.
28. Id.; see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850 (establishing the grounds and procedure for obtaining state
postconviction relief).
29. 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000).
30. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 559; see Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618,621 (Fla. 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Nixon I] (applying Croni's presumption of prejudice to Nixon's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim); Bqykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43 (concluding that reversible error occurred when the record did
not show that the defendant voluntarily entered a guilty plea).
31. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 559. Justice Wells, dissenting in Nixon 11, disagreed with the major-
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court again remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Nixon
tacitly consented to Corin's concession strategy. 32 On remand, the trial court
found that Nixon consented to Corin's trial strategy, but the Supreme Court of
Florida reversed and remanded for a new trial pursuant to its ruling in Nixon v.
Singletay.33 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
"whether counsel's failure to obtain the defendant's express consent to a strategy
of conceding guilt... automatically renders counsel's performance deficient, and
whether counsel's effectiveness should be evaluated under Cronicor Strickland."
34
II. Holding
The United States Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court of Florida
erred when it equated Corin's trial strategy to an unauthorized guilty plea and
when it applied Cronies presumption of prejudice. 3' The Court determined that
Corin's concession strategy did not fall within Croni's narrow exception to the
Strickland standard, the situation in which counsel fails " 'to function in any
meaningful sense as the Government's adversary.' ,36 When counsel, as in Nixon,
"informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's
best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not
impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent.)
37
Rather, if defense counsel's trial strategy satisfies the Stricklandtest, the defendant
will fail in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.38
III. Anaysis
Unlike the Supreme Court of Florida, the United States Supreme Court
declined to equate Corin's defense strategy with a guilty plea.39 The Court
ity's application of Cronic. Nixon II, 758 So. 2d at 629 (Wells, J., dissenting). Wells concluded that
Nixon's ineffective assistance claim should be governed by Stricklandand that "[n]o fair reading of
the instant record can lead to the conclusion that Nixon was 'denied any meaningful assistance at
all.' " Id. at 634 (quoting Chadwick v. Green, 740 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cit. 1984)).
32. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 559; see Nixon II, 758 So. 2d at 624-25 (deeming Corin's concession
of guilt to be an abandonment of the defense absent explicit consent and remanding for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Nixon expressly consented).
33. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 559-60; see Nixon v. State, 857 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 2003) (reversing
and remanding based on Nixon's ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
34. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 560; see Florida v. Nixon, 540 U.S. 1217, 1217 (2004) (granting
certiorari).
35. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 561-62.
36. Id. at 562 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 666).
37. Id. at 563.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 561. The Court first presented a list of landmark cases establishing that the decision
of whether or not to plead guilty resides ultimately with the defendant. Id. at 560. See Strckland,
466 U.S. at 688 (noting that defense counsel must consult with the accused regarding important
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distinguished Corin's concession of guilt from the truncated proceeding charac-
terized in Brookhart v. Janis4 as " 'the equivalent of a guilty plea.', 4. In Brookhart,
defense counsel agreed to a "prima facie" bench trial in which the "[s]tate need
only make a prima facie showing of guilt" and defense counsel "would neither
offer evidence on petitioner's behalf nor cross-examine any of the State's wit-
nesses."42 Thus, counsel effectively waived the defendant's right to challenge the
prosecution's case on the factual issue of guilt or innocence. 3 In contrast,
Nixon's defense counsel held the State to its burden of proof, retained the right
to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, and preserved appealable issues."
On these facts, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the "full presen-
tation to the jury in Nixon's case [did] not resemble [the] severely abbreviated
proceeding" that the Brookhart Court equated to a guilty plea.45
Further, the Court concluded that the Supreme Court of Florida's erroneous
conclusion that Corin's strategy amounted to a constructive guilty plea resulted
in its application of the wrong legal standard to determine whether defense
counsel were ineffective.46 Because the Florida court determined that Nixon did
not explicitly consent to the "guilty plea," the court improperly presumed preju-
dice under the standard set forth in Cronic, which is applicable only when defense
counsel" 'entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
decisions and overall defense strategy); Brookbart, 384 U.S. at 6-7 (holding that defense counsel
could not enter the "equivalent of a guilty plea" without the client's knowing and intelligent
agreement). But see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) (concluding that the obligation
to consult with the defendant does not require counsel to obtain consent for "every tactical
decision").
40. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
41. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 561 (quoting Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 7); see Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 6-7
(finding that defense counsel's agreement to a "prima facie" case was the "equivalent of a guilty
plea").
42. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 7.
43. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 561.
44. Id.; see Nixon I, 758 So. 2d at 631 (Wells,J., dissenting) (noting that Nixon's trial counsel
"actively engaged in the trial, including conducting an extensive voir dire, objecting to photographs
as unduly gruesome, and moving for a mistrial .... In the penalty phase, Nixon's trial counsel
presented the testimony of eight witnesses[,] ... introduced substantial documentary evidence,
including school, institution, and psychological reports'. In its closing, the State acknowledged that
"notwithstanding any concessions by defense counsel, the burden remained on the State to prove
its case . . . beyond any reasonable doubt; what a lawyer says . . . is not evidence." Brief for
Petitioner at 8, Nixon (No. 03-931).
45. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 561.
46. Id.
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testing.' "" Corin's concession of guilt, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded, did not constitute such a complete failure.'
The Court limited this conclusion to the unique circumstances of the capital
case, noting that in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, the best result
may be the avoidance of a death sentence.49 The Court acknowledged that the
pursuit of that goal is hindered if defense counsel send conflicting messages to
the jury: first, that the defendant did not commit the crime, and second, that he
is remorseful or mentally impaired.5" Thus, when deciding upon the best possi-
ble defense strategy, counsel must take into account both the guilt and penalty
phases of the capital trial.5 If defense counsel informs the defendant of a
concession strategy and the defendant fails to respond, counsel may proceed
subject to retrospective scrutiny under the Strickland standard. 2 If counsel's
conduct satisfies Strickland, his assistance will not be found ineffective.53
IV. Application in Virginia
For the above reasons, the Nixon Court rejected the argument that admit-
ting guilt, via concession in the opening and closing arguments, is the functional
equivalent of changing the plea to guilty. 4 However, the Court only reached
cases in which the lawyer explained the concession strategy to the defendant and
received no reaction. 55 The Nixon decision maintained the Sbticklandrequirement
that defense counsel consult with his client regarding important trial decisions
and strategies but declined to assert that defense counsel must also gain explicit
consent before proceeding with a concession strategy.5 6 The Court did not reach
the question of whether counsel would be ineffective, under Cronic or Strickland,
if he adopted a concession strategy like Corin's in defiance of his client's wishes.57
47. Id. at 562 (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 686-97
(2002) (noting that counsel's "failure must be complete" for a court to apply Croni's presumption
of prejudice rather than Stricklands two-pronged test for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel
claims).
48. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 562.
49. Id. The Court contrasted this to a non-capital case, noting that "[a]lthough such a
concession in a run-of-the-mine trial might present a close question, the gravity of the potential
sentence in a capital trial and the proceeding's two-phase structure vitally affect counsel's strategic
calculus." Id.
50. Id. at 563 (citing Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penaly Case: What Makes Death




54. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 561.
55. Id. at 561, 563.
56. Id. at 563.
57. See November 2, 2004 Oral Argument of Irving L. Gomstein on Behalf of the United
[Vol. 17:2
FLORIDA V. NIXON
Nixon also does not decide the case in which counsel fails to consult with the
client before conceding guilt.
The Nixon Court impliedly lends support to the converse of Nixon's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim: that a lawyer's ill-considered attacks on
unassailable evidence of guilt may themselves constitute ineffective assistance.
At the same time that the Court noted that counsel in a capital case "may reason-
ably decide to focus on the trial's penalty phase," the Court relied on the devel-
oping consensus of the capital defense bar that in the face of overwhelming guilt,
a " 'run-of-the-mill strategy of challenging the prosecution's case for failing to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt can have dire implications for the sentenc-
ing phase.' "s' Thus, the "may reasonably decide" language transforms into a
statement that defense counsel "should reasonably decide."
In other words, given the Court's reliance on these sources, Nixon suggests
that this form of attorney error-presenting inconsistent guilt and penalty phase
defenses-may rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel in the capital
case with overwhelming evidence of guilt. Failure to concede guilt in a capital
case--or, at least, quixotic attacks on overwhelming evidence of guilt-may,
under narrow circumstances, be found unreasonable under Strickland. With this
suggestion, the United States Supreme Court again acknowledged that "death is
different" and that the unique and irrevocable consequences of the capital case
require an equally unique consideration of defense strategies.5 9
Jessica M. Tanner
States as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioner at 19-20, Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (U.S.
Dec. 13, 2004), at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oraLarguments/argument-transcripts/03-
931.pdf (arguing that Strickland, and not Cronic, would still apply if the defendant did not consent).
58. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. at 563 (emphasis added) (quoting Scott E. Sundby, The CapitalJugy and
Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategv, Remorse, and the Death Penal, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 1557,
1597 (1998)); see Lyon, supra note 50, at 708 (noting the jury's proclivity for giving the death penalty
in the situation in which defense counsel attacks guilt and then also presents a "he is sorry he did
it" mitigation).
59. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972)) (recognizing "that the penalty of death is different in kind from
any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice"); see also Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (noting that because death is "qualitatively different," capital
cases require "a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death
is the appropriate punishment').
2005]

